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Abstract 
Purpose - This paper aims to illustrate the importance of introducing the integration manager 
(i.e., an executive position used to channel the acquiring firm’s course of action and 
strengthen the success of a post-acquisition integration process) within the acquiring firm’s 
board of directors. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – This is a theoretical paper that introduces the integration 
manager within the board of privately held firms going internationally via acquisitions and 
serving as an “out-insider” director able to balance the conflicting demands of the previously 
separated entities during their integration process. The authors present an explanatory case 
study that empirically contributes to board of directors’ design for internationalization. 
 
Findings - We posit that the integration manager serves as an “out-insider” director of the 
board for privately held firms, possessed by large-block shareholders, going internationally 
via acquisitions, providing the necessary expertise and knowledge of the target firm’s 
products and industry. 
 
Originality/value – The provided study aims to demonstrate that international acquisitions, 
even though apparently less risky than greenfield investments, may require additional neutral 
information flow – both within the due diligence process and the post-acquisition integration 
– that only outsiders possess. Such outsider has been individuated in the integration manager 
whose crucial role focuses on smoothing the pre- and post-acquisition integration processes. 
 
Keywords Board of directors, acquisitions, integration manager, corporate governance. 
Paper type Research paper  
 
Resumen 
Propósito – Estes artículo pretende ilustrar la importancia de introducir el gerente de 
integración (es decir, una posición ejecutiva utilizada para canalizar el curso de acción de la 
empresa y fortalecer el éxito de un proceso de integración post-adquisición) dentro de la junta 
directiva de la empresa compradora. 
 
Diseño / metodología / aproximación - Este es un artículo teórico que introduce el gerente 
de integración dentro de la junta directiva de las empresas privadas que van a nivel 
internacional a través de adquisiciones y sirviendo como director de "fuera-adentro" capaz de 
equilibrar las demandas conflictivas de entidades, previamente separadas, durante su proceso 
de integración. Los autores presentan un caso de estudio explicativo que empíricamente 
contribuye a el diseño de la junta directiva para la internacionalización. 
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Resultados - Nos postulan que el gerente de integración sirve como director de "fuera-
adentro" de la Junta para las empresas privadas, poseído por los accionistas de grandes 
bloques, pasando a nivel internacional a través de adquisiciones, aportando la ncesaria 
experiencia y conocimientos de los productos y la industria de la empresa objetivo. 
 
Originalidad / valor - El estudio provisto demostró que, yendo a nivel internacional a través 
de adquisiciones, aunque aparentemente menos arriesgado que las inversiones en nuevas 
instalaciones, puede requerir el flujo de información neutral adicional - tanto dentro del 
proceso de due diligence y la integración post-adquisición - que sólo los ajenos poseen. Tales 
ajenos se han individualizado en el gestor de integración cuyo papel en suavizar los procesos 
de integración antes y después de la adquisición fue descrito. 
 
 
Palabras clave: junta directiva, adquisiciones, gerente de integración, gobierno corporativo. 
 
Tipo de artigo: Artigo de investigação 
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Introduction 
Managing firm growth via internationalization, with a special emphasis on cross-border 
acquisitions, has been a mainstream of management studies in the last decades (Werner, 
2002; Hitt and Pisano, 2003; Aharoni et al., 2011; Reddy, 2014; Hitt et al., 2016). In 
addition, an attractive subfield at the interface of international business literature and 
corporate governance relates to the conditions leading international strategy (Tihanyi et al., 
2003; Hitt et al., 2006; Oesterle et al., 2013; Dagnino et al., 2014). On the other hand, the 
choice to internationalize may lead to situations wherein, inevitably, most decisions and 
actions have to be delegated with the risk of incurring in severe agency conflicts between 
principals and agents (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). This is more 
evident when firms go internationally via acquisitions, relatively to other entry modes, such 
as joint ventures (Iborra, 2004) – a strategic choice that could dramatically affect both the 
acquiring and acquired firm, particularly with regard to the crucial post-acquisition 
integration process (Ibora and Dolz, 2006; Canabal and White III, 2008).  
The risk of potential conflicts between principals and agents calls for a wider 
application of some traditional effective Corporate Governance Mechanisms (CGMs) serving 
as tools to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests. For instance, many studies suggest 
that board members would be better able to exert their advising role if they would possess the 
right knowledge and expertise of the business and its related industry (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
Drawing on corporate governance theory, this paper proposes the insertion of the 
integration manager within the acquirer’s board of directors as the best qualified individual 
able to contribute to such crucial CGM through her/his expertise and knowledge of the target 
firm’s industry and products. Previous literature on international business contends that 
integration managers play multiple roles during acquisitions (Dagnino and Pisano, 2008; 
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Teerikangas et al., 2011). More specifically, on the one hand, the integration manager helps 
the top management team to better formulate and implement corporate strategy, particularly 
in the context of cross-border acquisitions (Shimizu et al., 2004); while, on the other hand, 
s/he might facilitate the acquisition process making it smoother and more effective. Yet, we 
give recognition to a novel and additional role: indeed, we look forward to introducing such 
individual within the board of privately held firms going internationally via acquisitions and 
serving as an “out-insider” director able to balance the conflicting demands of the previously 
separated entities during their integration process. 
After having provided a conceptual response to our research question (namely, 
whether the role of the “integration manager”, as an additional CGM enhancing the 
effectiveness of the board of directors, can positively affect the performance of a cross-border 
acquisition), we though acknowledge that an empirical challenge remains in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the integration manager’s inclusion within the acquiring firm’s board of 
directors for strategic and control issues. With a specific focus on this issue, our study is 
inspired by the qualitative analysis of an acquisition of a Spanish firm by an Italian privately 
held firm operating in the telecommunication industry. We provide a case study of both 
explanatory and instrumental nature (Stake, 1995) to empirically illustrate our conceptual 
arguments and juxtapose the extent to which they are likely to hold true in real life practice.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on the role of 
board of directors in the context of international acquisitions describing the integration 
manager and her/his main traits. From a corporate governance perspective, section 3 
speculates on the role of the integration manager who may serve as an additional strategic 
tool providing better information, monitoring and control, especially if taking a seat on the 
board of the acquirer – yet a largely unexplored topic and main focus of our analysis. Section 
4 offers a discussion on the methodological landscapes of our empirical study; specifically, 
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we focus on the criteria for theoretical sampling, then we offer a concise case description 
illustrating data collection and analysis procedures. Section 5 focuses on a case study 
resembling the preliminary assumptions of our paper. The final section summarizes our 
conclusions and managerial implications.  
 
Theoretical Background  
The Board of Directors 
Scholars typically describe board of directors as the formal institution linking a firm’s 
shareholders with the managers entrusted of the daily functioning of a firm (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Monks and Minow, 1995). Even though they vary considerably depending on 
the country in which the firm operates (Charkham, 1994), they are CGMs empowered by 
shareholders to exercise ultimate control over top management. Nowadays, the role of boards 
has changed a lot from what it used to be in the past. While they previously used to be almost 
passive and formal institutions simply able to ratify management decisions, their current 
importance/activities have grown exponentially (Golden and Zajac, 2001), particularly when 
considering the monitoring action to which they have been exposed by media and investors 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Moreover, the expansion of acc unting and financial scandals 
(such as Enron, Parmalat, and Worldcom) have been pushing for the board’s greater 
involvement in strategic decisions, such as corporate-level strategies, acquisitions and 
alliances. In such standpoint, it is crucial to understand what characteristics boards do need to 
exhibit in order to be able to provide a correct evaluation of a cross-border acquisition; or, in 
different words, what peculiarities their directors need to possess in order to have the right 
knowledge and expertise to allow such CGM’s correct functioning.  
The primary role of directors is protecting shareholders’ interest and monitoring 
management behavior; to perform this task, they are empowered to discipline or remove 
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ineffective management teams (Williamson, 1984). Therefore, they can be considered as 
agents of the owners/shareholders whose fundamental activity is overseeing management 
choices. Furthermore, they are supposed to be over-skilled in industry matters and, hence, 
able to provide managers of both advice and counsel. Thus, the main difference between 
board and management is that the former is primarily responsible to monitor and shape 
strategy, while not always for elaborating and implementing strategic choices as the latter 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Empirical literature shows the importance of boards of directors in situations of severe 
agency costs – for instance, when negotiating and implementing an acquisition – but with 
little evidence in connecting board features to corporate performance (Barnhart et al., 1994). 
Instead, board characteristics have been studied to evaluate how they influence acquisition 
performance via the CEO tenure (Walters et al., 2007). However, some authors posit that 
boards and top management teams represent a legitimation signal able to convince external 
investors of the goodness and potential value of a certain investment, such as an acquisition 
(Certo, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Higgins and Gulati, 2006).  
In conclusion, we emphasize the analysis performed by Redor (2015). By considering 
“four board attributes: (1) board independence, (2) board size and director-specific attributes, 
(3) board ownership and compensation, and (4) multiple directorships” (Redor, 2015:1), the 
author concludes that “the impact of board attributes on shareholder wealth in mergers and 
acquisitions is specific to each firm” (Redor, 2015:1). 
 
The Role of the Board of Directors in the Context of an International Acquisition 
International acquisitions are phenomena through which a firm (the acquirer) decides to buy 
the controlling stock of another firm operating in a foreign country (the target) for strategic or 
financial motives (Hitt et al., 2015). Since “great difficulties in achieving the expected value 
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resulting from synergies emerge” (Aureli, 2015: 895), they are financially severe operations 
and, as such, subordinated to the board’s approval. 
The performance of an acquisition is the measure of its post-transaction effectiveness 
(Schoenberg, 2006). However, such measures are various. Actually, “most scholars refer to 
«integration» as an umbrella term for different and distinctive acculturation strategies, e.g. 
integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization; (…) some studies mix different 
levels of analysis with respect to culture constructs, e.g. national vs. organizational culture; 
and finally, there exist various definitions of «M&A success», which become manifest in a 
plethora of measurement techniques” (Dauber, 2012: 375). Generally speaking, an 
international acquisition may be considered effective when it fulfills the primary objectives 
declared by the management to achieve the board’s approval. Such objectives can be of 
financial diversification via internationalization or strategic goals in foreign markets (Hitt et 
al., 2015). Managerial literature shows that more than 50% of cross-border acquisitions do 
not maintain their promises getting divested very often (Shimizu et al., 2004). Sometimes 
failure occurs as deals are pushed by hubris (Seth et al., 2000; Picone et al., 2014), some 
others for cultural incompatibility between the two firms (Datta and Puia, 1995; Björkman et 
al., 2007; Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Hence, such list of potential problems emphasizes the need 
to legitimize the acquiring firm’s board of a more active role in order to be entitled to provide 
a better judgment of the deals to be implemented.  
Board of directors’ effectiveness is typically function of its independence, size and 
leadership structure (Bange and Mazzeo, 2004). To be independent, it needs to be mostly 
deprived of any kind of ties to the firm’s management and CEO. Therefore, we mainly look 
at outside directors whose external position implies the highest level of independence. A 
board that is composed of a good average of outsiders is supposed to take decisions 
maximizing shareholders’ interests (Cotter et al., 1997). Thus, it should be able to evaluate 
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the individuated synergies, the target’s bidding price and premium, the strategic and 
organizational fit of the two firms, and any potential issue regarding the overall integration 
process, especially when the business combination involves firms operating in two different 
countries. 
Of course, considering the complexity of such evaluations and the multifaceted 
specialization wherein directors should be so competent (members’ diversity), it is 
predictable that, when the size of the board increases, its evaluating and monitoring capacity 
should also proportionally increase (Barthala and Rao, 1995). Since cross-border acquisitions 
are risky deals, the size of the board can play an important role. Nevertheless, the presence of 
many outside directors is not necessarily a positive aspect of board composition. In fact, the 
benefits corresponding to an increase in size could be outweighed by a cost increment due to 
a harder communication and a slower decision-making process
1
. Consequently, a limited 
number of directors, even though reducing competences’ width, should speed up the 
decision-making process rendering it more efficient and effective (Yermack, 1996). Overall, 
diversity and size can be considered double-edge swords.  
In terms the boards’ leadership structure, the main issue refers to the individual who 
is supposed to seat as chairman. Herein, the literature is ambiguous (Baliga et al., 1996; 
Coles and Hesterly, 2000), but mainly supportive of the idea that, in order to be independent 
and able to both monitor and judge management actions without any external influence, 
boards of directors should be led by a person who is different from the CEO (Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Daily and Dalton, 1994). Thus, the CEO and the 
chairman of the board must not coincide onto the same person, otherwise such instrument’s 
ability to function effectively as an internal CGM would be severely curbed. Indeed, by 
serving simultaneously in both positions, a CEO would exert too much stature and influence 
                                                
1
 Congestion in the decision process could cause a reduction in the board of directors’ power, leaving the firm’s 
management with major discretion.  
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on board’s members and on their capability to monitor managerial actions in an independent 
manner (Sundaramurthy et al., 1997). Of course, a board aligned to management interests 
would try to protect them from the risk of a takeover, attempting to reduce the action of an 
external CGM such as the market for corporate control. On the contrary, a board aligned to 
shareholders’ interests would always try to maximize the deal’s expected value. 
 
The Role of the Integration Manager in the Context of an International Acquisition 
This paper aims to clarify the role of the integration manager within the acquiring firm’s 
board of directors. In this perspective, we offer an overview of the literature on integration 
managers. 
Whereas only in the last two decades consulting firms have started to suggest the use 
of integration teams in order to smooth the merging process between the acquiring and 
acquired firms (Ashkenas et al., 1998; Ashkenas and Francis, 2000; Shelton, 2003), empirical 
investigation and theoretical modeling regarding these teams are still scant (Dagnino and 
Pisano, 2008; Teerikangas et al., 2011; Meglio et al., 2015). The importance of appointing 
integration managers to guide acquisitions was already recognized in the 1980s with some 
academics discussing the crucial role of a specific team in charge of smoothing the different 
stages of the acquisition process (Dionne, 1988; De Noble et al., 1988). Teerikangas et al. 
(2011) support such view providing empirical evidence of the integration manager’s role by 
analyzing several cases of cross-border acquisitions. They found that, in most of the 
examined acquisitions, integration managers affected the results by helping synergies and 
avoiding value leakage. More specifically, by individuating some specific roles – the change 
agent, staff mobilizer, and knowledge promoter roles – they elucidated the way such manager 
can align the conflicting demands originating from both the acquirer and the acquired side. 
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Indeed, from an agency theory perspective, the integration manager’s multifaceted role seems 
to consistently help the new entity to achieve a new and positive equilibrium.  
In order to cover her/his role, this individual should: a) possess specific technical 
competences; b) have knowledge of the products/services and of the market of the acquired 
firm; c) and own substantial experience of the targeted industry. This latter aspect may reveal 
crucial especially with regard to international acquisitions, wherein cultural differences 
among dissimilar countries may have a critical impact on the deal’s ultimate performance 
(Ahammad et al., 2016; Sarala et al., 2014; Datta and Puia, 1995); and, at general level, with 
regard to the degree of relatedness of acquisitions, which might require the need of local 
experience within an industry with which the acquirer might be unfamiliar (Bettis, 1981; 
Chatterjee et al., 1992).  
Combined with these technical features, the integration manager should also show 
elements of personality and character resembling those of a transformational leader (Conger 
and Kanungo, 1987; Van de Ven, 1986; Bass, 1985). For instance, by analyzing the role of 
team leaders in supporting ambidexterity within acquisitions, Nemanich and Vera (2009) 
examined integration managers specifically focusing on their transformational leadership 
behaviors. They contended that, being acquisitions a dynamic context seriously challenging a 
current status quo, their success requires the guide of a transformational leader, that is 
someone who has a vision and is inspirational, charismatic and intellectually stimulating for 
those involved in the integration process. Such peculiarities of transformational leadership 
appear to be crucial in the context of an integration process. In fact, they seem to be useful in 
order to win the skepticism and distrust typically gripping acquired human resources, helping 
them to identify with the new entity’s course of action and to develop a common and unique 
identity (Smith et al., 2013). In other words, to achieve human resources’ trust and respect 
stimulating their full commitment to the new course, they need to be led by a leader who is 
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able to implement a restructuring process organized to capture the value of the combining 
firms, achieving the best output from the two firms’ complementary assets and capabilities 
(Antila, 2006). Indeed, restructuring is one of the most typical integration mechanism 
employed by acquiring firms in order to eliminate redundancies, reduce costs and exploit 
synergies through coordination. This is a crucial phase able to destroy value and therefore 
feared by those involved in the process. When restructuring creates uncertainty among 
employees, the risk of turnover and loss of crucial capabilities is extremely high (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2000; Zhang et al., 2015). Hence, it is in this phase that 
the integration manager has to prove her/his transformational leadership qualities, being able 
to clearly communicate her/his ideas of the way s/he is going to integrate the two firms 
(Ullrich and van Dick, 2007). The same applies when the integration manager has to form 
and lead the transition teams. As another typical integration mechanism (Meglio et al., 2015), 
transition teams need to include individuals from both integrating entities in order to bring 
multiple perspectives and experiences to the merging process. The heterogeneity of such 
perspectives and experiences should help the new entity in identifying the best solutions for 
achieving synergies and detecting areas of improvement under the coordination ability of the 
integration manager. Such human resources’ integration seems to play a central role for the 
success of acquisitions (Correia et al., 2013). Therefore, once vested of the legitimacy of such 
role, the integration manager would be in charge of leading the acquired firm, representing 
the acquirer’s interests within the subsidiary, having care to manage the integration process in 
order to reach the acquirer’s objectives.  
Among the roles individuated in the integration manager’s theoretical framework 
(Dagnino and Pisano, 2008), special mention has to be done for the organizational buffer’s 
role. It relates to the network of relationships s/he has with both the board of the acquirer and 
the management of the acquired firm. Whether, on the one side, s/he is in charge of 
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implementing the objectives and strategic guidelines received by the acquirer’s board, s/he 
needs to filter the pressures on the other. Indeed, the board bears continuous pressure from 
shareholders asking for the financial results of their investment. Being the board composed of 
those same managers who proposed the deal, and being it the CGM that approved the 
acquisition, it is likely that there will be a constant request for results even after a short time 
from the deal’s closure. Such pressure represents a serious risk of compromising the all 
integration activity. Managers who are working to exchange their knowledge and achieve 
synergies cannot be stressed and put under pressure with a constant request for results. 
Therefore, it is the integration manager who needs to filter such pressures and use all her/his 
network capabilities and communication skills in order to protect the integration process.  
 
Conceptual Development: Co-Opting The Integration Manager within the Acquiring 
Firm’s Board of Directors 
Usual steps when adopting a qualitative research include the collection and analysis of 
available data, the emerging conceptual categories with the connected structures and 
frameworks, and then the link for theoretical development. Notwithstanding that, in order to 
simplify the reader’s comprehension of our case study, we decided to start by illustrating the 
conceptual development of the benefits of co-opting the integration manager within the 
acquiring firm’s board of directors and interpreting the theoretical implications of our case 
later (Suddaby, 2006; Moschieri, 2011).  
In view of the complexity of her/his role, no doubt the integration manager needs to 
be legitimated from above in order to attempt many different tasks and achieve everybody’s 
commitment. In fact, being a mediator between the board of the acquirer and the management 
of the acquired firm, s/he needs to develop a trustable image at the eyes of the beholders. 
More specifically, both sides need to trust her/his activity and competence: to get 
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everybody’s trust, on the acquirer’s side, the board needs to officially vest her/him of the 
necessary legitimacy, empowering such manager of a leading role within the firm, and 
approving/following her/his intuitions at both strategic and organizational level; on the 
acquired firm side, managers need to identify such manager with someone to trust, someone 
able to provide a solution to any arising problem and, most of all, someone who is retained 
extremely competent both in terms of the product/market and its technical aspects. This latter 
characteristic is very important, as people in the acquired firm would always rely on the 
integration manager’s suggestions, as s/he would be competent of the product, thereby 
knowing how to develop or improve its performance (Dagnino and Pisano, 2008). Moreover, 
s/he knows the market; thus, s/he knows its customers with their own preferences, the 
competitors with their alternative offers, and the suppliers with their different strengths and 
weaknesses. Such manager’s “global” knowledge is of extreme importance to our work that, 
as we anticipated, is contextualized with a primary focus on privately owned firms (Dagnino 
and Pisano, 2008). 
Even though we lack of a wide literature on the role of boards of directors within 
privately owned firms, we can certainly ascertain that, in such context, their monitoring role – 
in contrast to publicly held firms – is sensibly minimized, as wners and managers tend to 
coincide (Cannella and Galvagno, 2002). This means that the control role of the board is less 
dominating compared to its counseling role. Undeniably, when a single individual or a family 
controls a major block of stocks or even the majority of the shares, the power of both 
directors and managers is considerably reduced (Zald, 1969). In the context of privately 
owned firms, power is centralized as much as for widely dispersed ownership situations. 
Thus, even though the “forms” of board’s actions are kept in order to satisfy legal 
obligations, the board serves at the discretion of the controlling owners. This means that its 
monitoring role is mostly deleted becoming a mere ratification task; whereas, instead, it is the 
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consulting role that is maintained still active. It is for this reason – and because of the 
necessity to provide this individual with a legitimated position inside the whole firm – that 
the integration manager should be framed as a member of the board of directors. Herein, s/he 
could help executives by participating to the strategy process and contributing with her/his 
knowledge of the product/service, market and country, particularly in the context of cross-
border acq isitions. In this sense, Leksell and Lindgren (1982) stressed that firms 
emphasizing the board’s external role tend to structure it around local outside directors who 
are well connected in the subsidiary’s country – a crucial specificity that is perfectly 
resembled by our case study. 
Following McDonald et al. (2008) suggestions with regard to board composition in 
acquisitions, we suggest that the integration manager may be the individual who, if 
introduced in the acquirer’s board, could improve its capabilities through the necessary 
knowledge and expertise. More specifically, McDonald et al. (2008) contend the importance 
of directors who possess such expertise in the context of related acquisitions. However, when 
acquisitions are of cross-border nature, such expertise might become even more crucial given 
the heterogeneities of the two related industries and of the countries wherein the two merging 
entities operate. Moreover, as stressed by Coff (1999) who examined uncertainty in the case 
of acquisitions within knowledge-intensive industries, this industry typology combined with 
an international acquisition may suggest the identification of a local individual as integration 
manager to provide such knowledge and allow the merger of a higher likelihood of success. 
However, a key aspect remaining unsolved regards the origin of the integration 
manager. Previous studies have considered three possible options (Dagnino and Pisano, 
2008). The first option is selecting an individual who was previously working in the acquired 
firm. The advantages of such choice could be the degree of trustworthiness s/he would inspire 
in the acquired firm’s managers, and the knowledge of the firm’s product and market s/he 
Page 14 of 36Management Research, The Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Management Research, The Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management
15 
 
would possess if compared to an outsider. The disadvantages of such choice would mainly 
relate to her/his motivation. In fact, nobody can be sure of her/his emotive status before being 
appointed to such crucial role. 
The second option is selecting an individual who was previously working in the 
acquiring firm. The potential advantage of such choice is connected to the integration 
manager’s knowledge of the acquiring firm’s objectives and culture. Herein, s/he would 
exactly know what results to reach and what managing style the acquiring board would 
prefer. However, the risk of this choice relates to the probability of acceptance of such figure 
within the acquired firm. In order to improve the chance of acceptance, the board should be 
careful in choosing an individual with strong empathy and communication skills, legitimating 
her/his position at the eyes of the all stakeholders.  
The third option is selecting the integration manager as an outsider to both firms, as it 
occurred in our case study. In such case, the lack of relationships with both firms’ individuals 
should be compensated by a strong experience of the industry and a brilliant combination of 
skills and competences in order to capture everybody’s trust and respect.  
INSERT HERE FIGURE 1 
 
Methods 
According to Yin (1994), the case study research approach is a “to be preferred way” of 
reconnoitering the “how” and “why” questions referred to a phenomenon occurring in real-
life contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; 
Reddy, 2015). In this paper, the purpose of our case study is to explore whether the role of 
the “integration manager” as an additional CGM enhancing the effectiveness of the board of 
directors can positively affect the performance of an acquisition.  
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Sample case 
We conducted a case study about an acquisition regarding an Italian and a Spanish firm in the 
telecommunication industry. We named the acquirer 2PM SpA and the acquired firm 
Espanola SA (firms’ real denominations were disguised for privacy reasons). The selection of 
a case study should be grounded on its relevance for investigation aims instead of statistical 
reasons (Pettigrew, 1990; Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993). Indeed, the case we are going to 
present exhibits some aspects we considered crucial for our analysis. First, it is a case of 
cross-border acquisition in a related industry; this helps us to avoid any difficulties due to 
industry differences, as widely stressed by managerial literature (the debate of related vs. 
conglomerate acquisitions) (Bettis, 1981; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Second, the two 
merging firms’ countries are in the same cluster following Hostfede’s and Globe studies 
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991; House et al., 2004) helping us to avoid any difficulties due to the risk 
of cultural clashes. Third, the deal can be classified as a friendly acquisition, allowing us to 
examine the development of each process without the biases determined by the acquired 
firm’s resistance to the deal’s positive closure (Teerikangas et al., 2011). Fourth, we selected 
a case whose data could be verified in the years following the deal’s closure helping us avoid 
any risk of naïve short-term evaluations (Schoenberg, 2006). Finally, we selected a specific 
case study wherein we ascertained the presence of an integration manager vested of the 
leadership of the integration process (Dagnino & Pisano, 2008). 
 
Case description 
The acquirer was a medium-sized firm with a turnover of Euro 215 million and 2,780 
employees. Even if directed by a top management team, 2PM SpA was under the control of 
Ciltel SpA, the family holding firm. Over the last two decades, its expansion in the ICT 
industry occurred primarily through greenfield investments, domestic acquisitions and 
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strategic alliances. Since 1998, the firm became one of the most important players in the 
Italian telecommunication industry. By 2008, with the horizontal acquisition of Espanola SA, 
a Spanish firm operating in the same business, 2PM strengthened its position in the European 
telecommunication market. The due diligence process and the first post-acquisition phase 
have been supervised and monitored by the 2PM’s board of directors by means of a Spanish 
top manager who has been appointed as a member of the board. Such manager, previously 
neither working for the Espanola SA nor for 2PM SpA, can be seen as an “integration 
manager”. Essentially, the integration manager is an outsider who was selected because of 
her/his industry experience, her/his previous relationships with both firms, and her/his local 
connections at both political and institutional level. The importance of this last point is 
dramatic. In fact, being it a cross-border acquisition, getting local legitimacy was required to 
avoid potential obstructions at country-level.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
We collected data at the acquirer’s headquarters for approximately one year, starting in early 
2007. Our primary data sources were twofold: archives and interviews. We started to collect 
data by gathering extensively from both internal and external sources: the former included 
internal reports and presentations; the latter included media articles regarding the two firms 
involved in the deal. 
We perpetuated data collection by means of semi-structured interviews. After the 
acquisition, we interviewed multiple senior-level informants from both firms (see Table 1 for 
a list of the interviewees’ positions within the two firms). The pilot interviews guided our 
identification of the informants who were the most influential in the acquisition process. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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The use of multiple informants mitigates subject biases and allows us the triangulation 
of facts (Miller et al., 1997) leading to richer and more convincing findings (Schwenk, 1985). 
The open-ended protocol allowed us to seek for further information and probe unanticipated 
insights (Yin, 1994). We used such interviews in order to identify major decisions regarding 
the acquisition of the target firm, which then we combined with those previously identified in 
the archival information triangulating data. We ended data collection process once a 
sufficient level of saturation was achieved (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
The interview guide was organized in two main sections. The first one was made of 
open-ended questions providing informants with an extensive view of both buyer and target 
businesses. The second secti n focused on specific questions about the acquisition process 
and its governance issues. Examples of questions included: “when did you first begin 
thinking about the acquisition?”; “what was your first reaction about the M&A?”; “has your 
reaction changed after some time?”; “and, if yes, why?”; “what potential integration manager 
did you consider?”; “what kind of interactions did you have with the integration manager?”; 
“why did you decide to include the integration manager within the board of directors?”; 
“what was the impact of the integration manager in the decision making process?”; “what is 
the weight you would attribute to the integration manager’s intervention?”.  
The interviews ranged from about one to two hours length.  
On the basis of Reddy et al. (2015), Table 2 summarizes the main features of the case 
study protocol.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Case Analysis and Discussion 
The Preexisting Structure of the Acquiring Firm 
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According to the policy of the acquiring firm, board members and top managers are entitled 
to own some shares of the firm. Thus, in addition to the board, the executive compensation 
system serves also as an effective CGM aligning shareholders and top management interests. 
According to the CEO, stock option plans contribute to enhance managers’ commitment to 
the firm. 
Since 2002, the acquiring firm has primarily grown within its domestic market 
without overlooking international arenas: for instance, some divisions were opened in 
Northern Africa and Eastern Europe. Even if moderate, the international expansion has also 
been strengthened via strategic alliances with notable players of the telecommunication 
industry. 
According to the strategic plan formulated by the CEO for the time horizon 2008-
2012 – approved by the board in order to expand the business scope – the firm decided to 
significantly encourage its international strategy through a cross-border acquisition. The firm 
identified one of the most important players in the Spanish telecommunication market – 
temporarily facing some financial constraints – and targeted it for an international horizontal 
acquisition.  
The friendly acquisition involved a Spanish target that was a medium-sized firm (180 
employees with revenues accounting for more than € 42 millions) owned by a large-block 
shareholder. As usual, the legal and financial due diligence for this business transaction was 
delegated to a leading consulting firm, even though assigned to the firm’s Spanish branch, 
since it possessed specific knowledge of domestic procedures.  
The acquirer was primarily concerned with harmonizing organizational and cost 
accounting procedures between the two merging firms; the top management replacement was 
only restricted to the acquired firm’s CEO, who resigned.  
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Finally, the board of directors selected an external top manager for the integration 
manager’s position in order to facilitate the post-acquisition integration process. He was an 
external manager with M&A expertise. 
The due diligence and post-acquisition processes were supervised and monitored by 
the board of directors by the means of a Spanish top manager, who was contextually 
appointed as member of the board. Such manager, previously working neither for the acquirer 
nor for the acquired firm (not for the consulting firm), was described as the acquiring firm’s 
integration manager. While the integration manager was external to the negotiation process, 
he was the protagonist of the business combination. When the two firms defined the price for 
the acquisition, the integration manager was called for managing the combination process 
between the two firms, for instance the negotiation with labor unions. Interestingly, the 
selected top manager had a positive reputation in Spain. All of these attributes were told to be 
very relevant for the entrant’s acquisition strategy (Teerikangas et al., 2011). Indeed, the 
integration manager acted as delegate of the acquirer’s board and possessed skills, 
information and legitimacy that facilitated the integration process (Teerikangas et al., 2011). 
Overall, the integration manager was involved in the planning and implementation processes 
(Teerikangas et al., 2011). 
 
Findings  
The integration manager is a Spanish top manager that 2PM previously met several times, 
due to her/his great experience about the Spanish telecommunication market and its domestic 
customers. S/he had a great reputation as s/he was well known in Spain. All these features 
can be considered relevant for the 2PM’s acquisition strategy. Indeed, such manager acted as 
a delegate of the acquirer’s board and possessed skills, information, and the legitimacy to 
facilitate the acquisition process. In addition, being it an international acquisition, s/he was 
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not seen from the acquired firm’s employees as a foreign manager of the acquirer who could 
take advantage of the transaction. Finally, due to her/his expertise, s/he might be considered 
as a “transformational leader”.  
Evidence revealed the pivotal role of the integration manager in ensuring the 
acquiring firm’s better entry into the new country. In our case study, the integration manager 
was specifically hired from the Spanish environment. Our finding that s/he was central to the 
firm’s acquisition performance is strongly consistent with other studies identifying the choice 
of a local “champion” as crucial in leading acquisition processes (Dagnino and Pisano, 2008). 
Indeed, selecting an integration manager who is alien to both organizations indicates the 
choice of the buyer to opt for the employment of an impartial managerial figure. Even if 
initially classifiable as a negative aspect, the lack of relationships with both firms’ individuals 
should though be compensated by a strong industry experience and an excellent combination 
of skills and competences in order to capture everybody’s trust and respect. In the words of 
the buying firm’s CEO: “The choice of a Spanish manager was strategically important to us. 
It helped us to create a positive atmosphere by the time of our first visits to the target.” In 
particular, the acquiring firm leaders viewed the choice of a Spanish manager as an 
opportunity to accrue substantial knowledge of the acquired firm’s products/services and of 
its market; moreover, it was a quicker way to achieve such knowledge, compared to what it 
could have occurred if the same objectives were to be accomplished through internal 
solutions. As a business development executive at acquiring firm commented: “Being able to 
quickly develop the broadest knowledge of the market regarding the acquired firm was 
crucial to us.” Moreover, the integration manager’s commonly recognized experience and 
expertise helped the entrant to be accepted within the local context, avoiding the typical 
uncertainty and fear characterizing the first 100-days following the deal’s closure (Singh and 
Montgomery, 1987). As affirmed by one of the team managers involved in the due diligence 
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process, such a decision was taken very carefully and was based on the firm’s previous 
experience in other domestic deals: “As this was not our first acquisition, we had certain 
knowledge of the process. In particular, we were conscious of how important the first 
occasions are wherein you get introduced to the target firm’s environment. The possibility to 
be walked in by a local and well-respected manager – formally invested of an important 
managerial role – gave us the opportunity to enter the room with the right foot.”  
After the completion of the negotiation process, the integration manager’s expertise 
revealed to be very critical. Thus, the acquiring firm almost immediately decided to co-opt 
the integration manager by placing him/her within the board of directors. As stated by the 
acquiring firm’s CEO: “Deciding to give this person a dedicated position inside the board 
served as a clear message, publicly advertising our commitment in the eyes of the target 
firm’s environment.” This choice further entrenched management relations, giving the 
integration manager the opportunity to directly interact with the top-level decision makers.  
Although the Spanish telecommunication industry was not unknown to the acquirer’s 
management, the aid of a local individual – directly involved in the strategy-making process 
and very well networked at local level – was tremendously fruitful in terms of her/his advices 
provided along the process. In the words of one of the board members: “The presence of the 
integration manager inside the board of directors gave us the possibility to examine 
influential information before approving the implementation of our market-entering strategy. 
Such support revealed to be an authentic advantage in explaining from an inside perspective 
various peculiarities of the Spanish environment we could have never known by ourselves”. 
For instance, the integration manager’s personal contacts with a local financial 
institution revealed to be very useful in implementing the firm’s financial plan. Moreover, 
her/his personal acquaintance with one of the major leaders of a local labor union opened up 
a new set of potential solutions in human resource management, smoothing the acquirer’s 
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entering strategy. In the words of an acquired firm’s manager: “I remember that meetings 
became immediately intense by the time of the first negotiations. For instance, if the deal was 
to go through, there were a few but quick decisions to take in order to avoid lay-offs. Well, I 
can affirm that after a couple of meetings between a few of us, the new Spanish manager and 
some representatives of labor unions, we had already unraveled our major doubts”.  
And in the words of another acquired firm’s manager: “One of the pillars of our 
previous internal policy was trying to always favor domestic suppliers. Therefore, after the 
deal’s closure, one of the main strategic issues on the table was how to reorganize our supply 
chain. I remember that the acquiring firm’s CEO was extremely resolute regarding this issue: 
he basically said that, before the decision’s approval, the proposal had to be 100% left to the 
new local manager, as s/he benefited of the complete trust of the board in finding the best 
solutions within the network of her/his personal contacts. And that’s exactly what happened”. 
Our study shows that the integration manager was very helpful to the acquirer during 
the all acquisition process. S/he was given the legitimacy to make some important decisions, 
such as those concerning the downsizing and down-scoping strategies of the target firm. 
Indeed, the integration manager neither laid-off employees nor changed completely the 
strategy of the acquired firm. Instead, s/he primarily acted as an organizational filter between 
the acquirer and the acquired firm, in the attempt to slowly align their firms’ cultures and cost 
management procedures. 
Furthermore, s/he facilitated the acquisition process by making use of her/his position 
as member of the board of directors. Our study shows that the external manager hired by 
2PM SpA to facilitate the acquisition process was invited by the acquiring firm’s CEO to take 
a seat as a member of the 2PM’s board of directors. Once the acquisition process was 
completed, s/he was no longer an outside member of the board, but began to serve as an 
insider, acting as a delegate of 2PM SpA within the acquired firm. According to the Chair of 
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the board, the appointment of the integration manager as a director enhanced significantly the 
effectiveness of 2PM’s board of directors, making the governance devices more effective in 
the alignment of shareholders and managers’ interests. The results of the post-acquisition 
integration phase are smooth and soon the acquired firm will change its name into 2PM 
Spain.  
 
Conclusions 
Notwithstanding their strategic relevance in real life practice, the role of integration managers 
is still overlooked by acquisition scholars (Meglio et al., 2015). Even if the results of our 
exploratory study cannot be easily generalized and extended to a larger number of firms (also 
in different industries and with alternative ownership structures), this paper highlighted the 
importance of additional tools enhancing the effectiveness of traditional governance devices 
used to align shareholders and managers’ interests.  
Drawing on corporate governance and international management literature, this paper 
focuses on the integration manager employed to strengthen the success of post-acquisition 
processes and to mitigate the difficulties due to the presence of entry barriers. Indeed, this 
paper demonstrated that, despite the fact that privately held c mpanies are monitored and 
controlled by their owners, the effectiveness of the board in counseling and directing the most 
important strategic decisions is significantly enhanced when these firms appoint an 
integration manager as board director. Indeed, while facilitating the integration process of the 
acquired firm, s/he represents a tie with the board of the acquirer wherein s/he takes a seat.  
In this paper, we emphasized the relevance of such CGMs even in privately held 
firms, which apparently cope with few agency problems due to their concentrated ownership 
structure. Indeed, this paper demonstrated that, even though private firms with high level of 
ownership concentration were daily monitored and controlled by the owner, the effectiveness 
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of the board in counseling and directing the most important strategic decisions may be 
significantly enhanced when, going internationally, firms appoint an integration manager as a 
new director. Therefore, this paper shows at both theoretical and empirical level that the 
integration manager might be an additional tool significantly enhancing the effectiveness of 
traditional CGMs – primarily the board, ownership concentration and executive 
compensation – to better serve shareholders’ interests.  
The provided study demonstrated that, going internationally through acquisitions, 
even if apparently less risky than greenfield investments, may require additional neutral 
information flow – within both the due diligence process and the post-acquisition integration 
– that only outsiders possess. Such outsiders have been individuated in the integration 
manager whose role in smoothing the pre- and post-acquisition integration processes was 
described. When appointed as a member of the board, the outsider becomes an insider if s/he 
is in charge to also run the acquired firm. Acting in such a way, any potential divergences 
between the principal and agent are eliminated even in those firms, like family-owned ones, 
that by definition encounter some agency problems.  
 
Managerial Implications 
This paper theoretically develops the idea of introducing the integration manager within the 
acquiring firm’s board of directors, showing her/his empirical contribution to the 
performance of acquisitions (Teerikangas et al., 2011). Drawing on our findings, it is 
promising to discern some insights that may guide executives in the deployment of resources 
(Roth, 1995) and introduce CGMs that epitomize successful cross-border acquisitions. 
First, our paper emphasizes the risks underlining the choice to go internationally 
through acquisitions; thus, it stresses the relevance of the information flows necessary for an 
effective due diligence process.  
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Second, the proposed role of the integration manager within the acquiring firm’s 
board of directors appears to be critical for entrenched organizational relations, allowing 
her/him to cooperate with the top-level decision makers.  
 Third, this paper proposes a managerial innovation in managing firms’ growth via 
internationalization, i.e., to revitalize the board of directors after a cross-border acquisition. 
However, “being aware of the integration manager’s roles, organizations engaging in [cross-
border] M&A are better positioned with regard to the tasks and activities assigned to the 
integration manager. This understanding can further serve as a means of selecting the 
integration manager – is the person capable of [covering such] roles?” (Teerikangas et al., 
2011: 679). 
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Figure 1. The functions of the board in the context of internationalization strategies and 
the advantages of coopting the integration manager for their implementation 
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Table 1. Summary of the individuals interviewed 
Firm Interviewees 
Acquiring firm CEO (1) Managers (3) 
Acquired firm Managers (2) 
Consultants employed in the acquisition process Consultants (3) 
 
  
Page 35 of 36 Management Research, The Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Management Research, The Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management
36 
 
Table 2: Summary of the main features of the case study protocol. Adaptation from 
Reddy, Xie and Agrawal (2015) 
 
Area of investigation Internationalization of firms through cross-border acquisitions 
Research setting This paper proposes the inclusion of the integration manager within 
the acquirer’s board of directors as the best qualified individual able 
to contribute to such crucial CGM through both her/his expertise and 
knowledge of the target firm’s industry and products 
Research scope International business, corporate governance, organization theory, 
business planning and evaluation 
Research aim We look at the ability of integration managers to serve as “out-
insider” directors able to balance the conflicting demands of two 
previously separated entities during their integration process 
Theoretical and 
empirical 
contributions 
While the role of integration managers is still overlooked by 
acquisition scholars (Meglio et al., 2015), this paper highlighted 
their importance as additional tools enhancing the effectiveness of 
traditional governance devices used to align shareholders and 
managers’ interests. Through the aid of a case study, we contributed 
to such developing literature by testing the success of such 
managerial figure. 
Research 
methodology 
Single case qualitative study 
Sampling region European Union 
Sample cases 2PM SpA, an Italian firm operating in the telecommunication 
industry  
Espanola SA, a Spanish firm operating in the telecommunication 
industry 
Temporary frame The Preexisting Structure of the Acquiring Firm 
The Acquisition of Espanola SA 
Data collection and 
analysis 
We collected data at the acquirer’s headquarters for approximately 
one year, starting in early 2007.  
Investigator The interviews and data coding were developed by two authors. 
Other authors validated the analyses in a second moment and 
advanced plausible interpretations helpful for improving 
international business and corporate governance literature. Editors 
and anonymous reviewers effectively contributed to interpret the 
results.   
Literature review 
and understanding 
of the case method 
Literature review focuses on the role of board of directors in the 
context of an international acquisition.  The implementation of case 
study follows Yin (1994).  
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